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ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP:
THE LIMITS OF AFROYIM v. RUSK
In Afroyim v. Rusk' the Supreme Court abandoned its section-by-
section attack on the expatriation provisions of the Nationality Act
of 19402 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 3 and
stated flatly that an American citizen4 has "a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes
that citizenship." 5 Commentators have suggested that the impact of
Afroyim may be restricted by a broad definition of "voluntary relin-
quishment." 6 In particular, it has been suggested that one who volun-
tarily obtains naturalization in a foreign country should be expatriated,7
and that such result can be considered a "voluntary" renunciation
under Afroyim.8 Congress could not so define "voluntary relinquish-
ment" because Afroyim requires intent to relinquish citizenship in
1 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
2 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 401-10, 54 Stat. 1168-71, superseded by Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1964). Specifically, Afroyim overruled
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), and held unconstitutional § 401(e) of the Nationality
Act of 1940, which provided for loss of nationality for voting in a foreign election. Perez
had held that section to be constitutional under the implied power of Congress to regulate
foreign affairs.
3 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-89 (1964).
4 The distinction between "citizenship" and "nationality" is immaterial for the
purposes of this note and the terms will be used interchangeably.
5 587 U.S. at 268. Had the Court based its decision on the narrow ground that voting
in a foreign election does not have "a sufficient relationship to the relinquishment of
citizenship-nor a sufficient quality of adhering to a foreign power," Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 83 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting), to justify expatriation, the impact of the
case on other expatriation provisions of the 1940 and 1952 acts would have been minimal.
But by relying on the "unequivocal terms of the [Fourteenth] Amendment itself," 387 U.S.
at 262, the Court has cast a shadow of constitutional doubt over the loss-of-nationality
area. Despite the apparent clarity of the Court's opinion in Afroyim, Congress has made
no attempt to revise the Immigration and Nationality Act. Indeed, the government con-
tinues to "expatriate" those who serve in foreign armies, though such expatriation seems
clearly unconstitutional under the "voluntary relinquishment" test. See 1967 IMMIGRATION
AND NATuRALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 28. However, a recent Justice Department ruling
suggests that the Government may take a more flexible attitude. The Justice Department
has concluded that although "'[v]oluntary relinquishment' of citizenship is not confined
to a written renunciation ... ," it is open to the individual concerned to raise the issue of
intent. The ruling states that "[i]n each case the administrative authorities must make
a judgment, based on all the evidence, whether the individual comes within the terms
of an expatriation provision and has in fact voluntarily relinquished his citizenship."
Justice Dep't Announcement, 37 U.S.L.W. 2444 (Jan. 18, 1969) (emphasis added).
6 See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 H.Av. L. RIv. 69, 188 (1967).
7 See id. at 137-38.
8 See Note, "Voluntary Relinquishment" of American Citizenship: A Proposed Defini-
tion, 53 Com LL.. L. REv. 325, 332 (1968).
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order for that citizenship to be lost. But the use of a presumption offers
a constitutional and workable method of dealing with American citizens
who obtain naturalization elsewhere.
I
THE CONCEPT OF "VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT"
Presently, section 849(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 19521 provides that an American citizen shall lose his nationality
by "obtaining naturalization in a foreign state."' 0 Short of a formal
renunciation of citizenship," naturalization by personal application in
another country would seem as unequivocal a renunciation of Ameri-
can citizenship as possible. There are, however, situations in which
the retention of American citizenship despite the voluntary acquisition
of a foreign nationality seems mandated by the reasoning of Afroyim.
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed in his dissenting opinion in
Afroyim, "voluntary renunciation" may mean either of two things
as applied to expatriation: it could mean that there must be "a specific
intent to renounce citizenship"'1 or that the "commission of an act
conclusively deemed by law to be a relinquishment of citizenship'1 3
was voluntary. Although earlier decisions often used the latter inter-
pretation,14 Afroyim renders irrelevant the mere voluntariness of
the act.' 5
Since a "specific intent to renounce citizenship" is, therefore, a
9 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1964).
10 Id. In fiscal 1967, 2,010 persons lost their citizenship, 921 of them because of
"obtaining naturalization in, or taking an oath of allegiance to, a foreign state." 1967
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERvIcE ANN. RiEp. 28. The number of persons losing
their citizenship has remained between 2,000 and 2,100 per year since 1965. In previous
years it was considerably higher, the drop being due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), which held unconstitutional expatriation of
naturalized citizens for extended residence abroad. See 1965 IMMIGRATION AND NATuRALIZA-
TION SERvic ANN. REP. 20.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (i964) provides that citizenship may be lost by formal
renunciation before an American consular officer abroad. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7) (1964) pro-
vides for a formal written renunciation within the United States, if the United States is
not at war, and if the Attorney General approves the renunciation as not contrary to
national defense interests.
12 887 U.S. at 269 n.1.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Savorgnan v. United States, 888 U.S. 491, 506 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare,
489 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
15 Mr. Afroyim's voting in Israel was certainly voluntary.
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necessary prerequisite for expatriation," the meaning of "intent" must
be considered. It cannot have a meaning similar to that of "intent" in
the law of torts-a knowledge that conduct will produce a given result
with substantial certainty17-since such an interpretation would require
no more than a voluntary act and a knowledge of the law of expatria-
tion, a result clearly prohibited by Afroyim. At the other extreme, "in-
tent" might simply mean "desire." If so-and there is language in the
Afroyim opinion to that effects--even the voluntary acquisition of
foreign citizenship would not result in loss of American citizenship
if the person concerned desired to remain an American.
There is a middle ground, however, which has been most clearly
expressed in the dissenting opinions in Perez v. Brownell.19 Justice
Douglas suggested that citizenship could be lost by an act that was both
voluntary and "consistent with a surrender of the right granted."20 The
Chief Justice stated that "citizenship may not only be voluntarily re-
nounced through exercise of the right of expatriation but also by other
actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country." 21 This
"dilution of allegiance" test has been embraced by several commenta-
torS22 and is quite appealing, for citizenship is generally considered as
compelling undivided loyalty to one's country. Yet the adoption of
such a test would transform the wall of protection of citizenship built
by the Afroyim court from a solid bulwark to a crumbling shell.23 The
problem, of course, is that the catalogue of acts "in derogation of un-
divided allegiance" is almost limitless. For instance, in 1949 a bill was
introduced in Congress that would have taken away citizenship for
becoming a member of a communist organization. 24 Even opposition to
American foreign policy-to the war in Vietnam, for example-might
indicate a dilution of allegiance. The first amendment might prevent
16 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255, 268 (1967).
17 See W. PRossER, TORTS § 8 (3d ed. 1964).
18 See 387 U.S. at 257: "[W]e reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any general power ... to take away an American
citizen's citizenship without his assent." (Emphasis added.)
19 356 U.S. 44, 62 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); id. at 79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 83.
21 Id. at 68 (footnote omitted).
22 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARe. L. Rxv. 69, 138 (1967); Note,
supra note 8, at 332; Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk, 48 B.U.L.
REv. 295, 303 (1968).
23 Cf. Dunne, Freedom of the Press, in MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAw 64 (F.
Bander ed. 1963): "A law, Hinnissy, that might look like a wall to you or me wud look
like a thriumphal arch to th' expeeryenced eye iv a lawyer."
24 H.R. 3435, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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the most extreme abuses of an "allegiance test"; but many activities,
such as the burning of one's draft card, are not protected by the first
amendment 25 and may demonstrate "derogation of undivided allegi-
ance," yet such acts surely should not result in expatriation. Indeed,
even voting in foreign elections might show a lessening of allegiance, 26
although the dissenters in Perez thought that it did not.27
Despite the Afroyim Court's citation of the principal dissents in
Pere, 28 the rationale of Afroyim would seemingly bar an "allegiance
test." Such a test would necessarily involve a legislative determination
of what acts were sufficiently contrary to the obligations of citizenship
to result in expatriation. The Court emphatically denied any congres-
sional power to take away citizenship involuntarily2 9 If a person does
not want to lose his citizenship, its loss as a result of doing specified
acts is involuntary so long as there is any possibility that the act is
reconcilable with a desire to retain American citizenship.
II
MISGUIDED LADmS AND OTHERS
It so happens that I know quite a number of misguided ladies
who have married foreigners, and I am deeply concerned that
when that takes place in the future there should not be any undue
hardship inflicted on them. Let them have a complete right to
keep their British nationality if they want to.30
The British Nationality Act of 194831 repealed a previous statutory
provision that anyone naturalized in a foreign country would lose
his British citizenship,3 2 and substituted a procedure for formal renun-
25 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968).
26 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 216, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935): "Certainly any native-
born citizen who becomes so much interested in the affairs of a foreign state as to
voluntarily vote abroad . . . does not hold United States citizenship so dear that its loss
would seriously disturb such citizen voting abroad."
27 See 356 U.S. at 85 (Whittaker, J., dissenting): "[N]or, I believe, can [voting in a
foreign election] ... be reasonably said to constitute an abandonment or any division or
dilution of allegiance to the United States."
28 387 U.S. at 256 n.7, 267, citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. at 62 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting), 79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29 387 US. at 257, quoted in note 18 supra.
30 156 PAuL. Di., H.L. (5th ser.) 1063 (1948) (remarks of Viscount Maugham).
31 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56.
32 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 13,
repealed by British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 34, sched. 4, pt. II.
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ciation of that citizenship, if desired.8 3 Also repealed was a provision
that a woman marrying a foreigner would lose her British citizenship
if by her marriage she acquired another nationality.34 The records of
the debates on the 1948 Act show that Parliament was concerned with
the welfare of British girls who had lost their citizenship by marrying
foreigners and who later wanted to return to England.85
American law no longer expatriates women who marry aliens.8 6
However, there may be circumstances in which it would be advanta-
geous, or even necessary, for a woman to acquire foreign citizenship
at the time of her marriage to a foreigner. In Savorgnan v. United
States37 petitioner voluntarily acquired Italian citizenship in order to
obtain the consent of the Italian government to her marriage to a
member of the Italian Foreign Service.38 Despite the district court's
finding of fact that petitioner had not intended to renounce her alle-
giance to the United States or to endanger her American citizenship,39
the Supreme Court held that petitioner had expatriated herself. The
decision was justified on the ground that the statutory expatriation
provision were objective; 40 constitutional issues were not considered,
even by the dissent.41
Savorgnan seems incorrect under the Afroyim test of voluntary
relinquishment. An American woman who acquires foreign nationality
33 British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 19. The 1948 Act provided in
§ 20 that naturalized British citizens could be deprived of their citizenship for continued
residence abroad without annual registration of intent to retain citizenship, or even for
"disloyalty." The British Nationality (No. 2) Act, 1964, c. 54, § 4 (2), repealed the provisions
of the 1948 Act concerning expatriation for residence abroad. A similar American statutory
provision was held unconstitutional in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
84 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 10,
amended by British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 1,
repealed by British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 34, sched. 4, pt. II.
35 See 156 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1061-67 (1948); 453 PARL. Dn., H.C. (5th ser.)
396, 423-25 (1948). In particular, a number of British subjects who had married Czechs were
apprehensive about the impending communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. Id. at 424-25.
36 Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, provided that an American
woman who married a foreigner would "take the nationality of her husband." If the
marriage ended, such a woman could regain her citizenship by registration. The Act
was modified in 1922 to apply only to women who married foreigners ineligible for citizen-
ship. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1022. The Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 442,
§ 4(a), 46 Stat. 1511, amending § 3 of the 1922 Act, provided that no woman would lose
her citizenship by marriage to an alien. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1489 (1964).
37 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
38 Id. at 494.
39 Savorgnan v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 109, 111 (W.D. Wis. 1947), rev'd, 171 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
40 338 U.S. at 497, 499.
41 See id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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in order to marry a foreigner may want to retain her American citizen-
ship, if only to facilitate return to this country upon divorce or the death
of her husband. An even stronger case for retention of American citizen-
ship is presented when foreign law provides for "automatic" naturaliza-
tion of women who marrry its nationals, as did the law of England
until 1948.42 Constitutional questions notwithstanding, however, such
"automatic" naturalization would not result in loss of American citizen-
ship under present statutes.43
Similarly, acts done under duress will not result in loss of citizen-
ship.44 However, if the pressures upon a person to acquire foreign
citizenship are not great enough to constitute duress, they may never-
theless be sufficient to make credible a declared intent to retain Ameri-
can citizenship. Plaintiff in Dubonnet v. Marshall45 was an American
woman resident in France during World War II. She had acquired
French citizenship in order, she maintained, to avoid being interned
by the Germans. The court did not "believe that the German Gestapo
were ignorant of the real facts in the case nor [sic] that she actually
believed that unless she became a French citizen her life was in dan-
ger... .-41 Even if the court was correct on the facts, a person finding
himself in an enemy-occupied country might have good reason for
acquiring a foreign citizenship, while wishing to retain his American
citizenship.
Perhaps the clearest example of a situation in which one might
acquire foreign nationality without any intent to renounce American
nationality is that of a person unaware of his American citizenship.
Persons born in the United States and taken abroad as infants may be
unaware of their place of birth, and thus of their American citizenship,
for many years.47 Could such a person have intentionally renounced
his American citizenship, if, believing himself a citizen only of the
country of his parents' nationality, he becomes naturalized in a third
country? A more important group, from the point of view of likely fu-
ture litigation, consists of those persons deprived of their citizenship for
42 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 1,
repealed by British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 34, sched. 4, pt. II.
43 The law requires that, in order to lose his citizenship by naturalization abroad, a
person must obtain "naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application" or upon
that of his parent or guardian together with his failure to establish a permanent residence
in the United States prior to his twenty-fifth birthday. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1964).
44 See, e.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 856 U.S. 129, 183 (1958): "[N]o conduct results in
expatriation unless the conduct is engaged in voluntarily." (Italics by the court.)
45 80 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1948).
46 Id. at 906.
47 See, e.g., Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
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voting in foreign elections or for violation of other statutory provisions
since held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.48 Believing them-
selves stateless, many became naturalized in foreign countries. It could
hardly be said that such people have renounced their citizenship by that
naturalization. To deprive such people of their citizenship would take
away the very right which Afroyim purports to assure.49
These few examples demonstrate that the automatic operation
of section 349(a)(l) 50 to expatriate everyone voluntarily naturalized
elsewhere is not constitutionally permissible under Afroyim. What,
then, are the alternatives?
III
DETERMINING INTENT-PRESUMPTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND POLICY
A. The British System
Under the British Nationality Act of 1948,11 the only method by
which a native-born citizen of the United Kingdom can lose his citizen-
ship is by making a declaration of renunciation in a prescribed man-
ner.52 Such a rule has an appealing simplicity and definiteness, yet is
unsatisfactory in many repects. A test which makes expatriation difficult
may be harsher than an "automatic" expatriation provision. Dual na-
tionality is generally an undesirable status for the person concerned: he
may be subject to military service in two countries and, in the event
of war between the countries of which he is a citizen, he may have "to
pay with [his life] for adopting the cause of one of the States against the
other."5 3 Loss of nationality has been asserted as a defense in a number
of prosecutions for treason.5 4 It is not realistic to assume that everyone
48 The 1965 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. states that the
number of expatriations in fiscal 1965 dropped sharply, largely as a result of Schneider
v. Rusk. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). The report also states that there were "a considerable
number of cases in which a finding of expatriation was reversed as a result of the Schneider
decision and other restrictive rulings by the Supreme Court during recent years." 1965
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 20.
During the past 10 years nearly 10,000 Americans were held to have lost their citizen-
ship under the statutory section held unconstitutional in Afroyim. 1967 IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SimwVc:a_ ANN. REP. 28.
49 The Immigration and Naturalization Service will re-open cases decided before
Afroyim. 1967 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERvIcE ANN. REP. 28.
50 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1964).
51 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56.
52 Id. § 19.
53 N. BAR-YAAcov, DUAL NATIONALITY 4 (1961) (footnote omitted).
54 See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 US. 717 (1952).
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wishing to renounce a former citizenship upon naturalization elsewhere
will take the trouble to go through formal renunciation procedures,
and it would be unreasonably harsh to attach citizenship to many who
do not desire it and are unaware of it. The major drawback of the
British approach is, therefore, that it would lead to an excessive num-
ber of cases of dual nationality.
Although dual nationality has been cited as "detrimental . . . to
the friendly relations between nations,"5' 5 it is difficult to see why this
should be true. For all the complaining by the Court 56 and Congress 57
that expatriation should be allowed in order to prevent embarrassment
in foreign affairs, there seem to be no examples of heightened inter-
national tensions because of the dual nationality of individuals. Of
course, if the United States were to attempt to protect an American
citizen against another country of which he was also a citizen, some
friction might develop; but there are rules of international law dealing
with the espousal of claims of dual nationals in international forums,58
and such matters as diplomatic protection of citizens abroad are discre-
tionary. 59 Consequently, dual nationality, however onerous a burden
it may be for the individual concerned, is not necessarily harmful for
the countries involved.60 Nevertheless, the disadvantages for individ-
uals of dual nationality seem adequate grounds for rejecting the
British approach.
B. Dramatic and Dull Oaths
In order to obtain naturalization in the United States, a person
must take an oath "to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sover-
eignty of whom or which [he] was before a subject or citizen."61 Many
55 N. BAn-YAAcov, DuAL NATIONALrTY 4 (1961).
56 In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), the Court seems to have used the fact
that great difficulties were caused by the refusal of some nations to permit voluntary
expatriation as an argument for the necessity of involuntary expatriation. Id. at 48. Such
reasoning seems somewhat unsound.
57 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 216, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
58 See generally H. vAN PANHUYS, THE RoLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERATIONAL LAW
73-81 (1959).
59 "The United States ... will as a rule not accord protection to an American citizen
against a country whose nationality he also possesses, although it will do so in exceptional
circumstances." P. WxIs, NATIONALITY AND STATEL.SNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1956)
(footnote omitted).
60 Furthermore, the Afroyim Court explicitly rejected embarrassment in foreign
affairs as grounds for a congressional expatriation power. 387 U.S. at 263.




countries, on the other hand, require only an oath of allegiance, with
no express renunciation of other citizenship. 62 Should the form of
oath a person has taken in acquiring Ruritanian citizenship determine
whether he loses his American citizenship? Although it has been sug-
gested that the question of whether one takes "a dramatic or a dull
oath" 63 should have little or no significance, 64 the better view is that
the form does matter. First, the taking of an oath in which one ex-
pressly renounces American citizenship seems no different, in principle,
from a formal renunciation of citizenship before a State Department
officer. Second, it is surely permissible for a country to insist upon
abandonment of former nationality as a condition of naturalization.
The only situation in which the voluntary taking of a "dramatic" oath
might not be a voluntary renunciation of American citizenship is
that of a person who did not know at the time that he was an
American."
C. Presumption of Intent to Renounce Citizenship
To minimize the number of acquisitions of dual nationality by
naturalization, it should be presumed that a person who voluntarily
obtained naturalization in a foreign country intended to renounce
his American citizenship. The presumption should be rebuttable by a
clear showing of lack of the requisite intent. Such lack of intent might
be shown by giving notice to the United States of intent to retain
American citizenship at the time of obtaining a foreign nationality. A
statutory requirement that such notice be given if American citizenship
is to be retained would be highly desirable as a means of minimizing
uncertainty as to citizenship status.
If such a requirement existed, a person obtaining naturalization in
a foreign country might pursue one of four possible courses of conduct.
62 E.g., Australia, Canada, Israel, and New Zealand. See LAws CONCERNING NATION-
ALrrY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B14 (1954). Of course the absence in the oath of any
express renunciation of foreign citizenship does not necessarily mean that the country
which administers the oath does not regard such nationality as being lost. See note 63
infra.
63 156 PAGE. DFa., H.L. (5th ser.) 1079 (1948) (remarks of the Lord Chancellor (Vis-
count Jowitt)):
The noble Earl seems to think that the fact that a man takes this rather more
dramatic Oath will have some real effect on his dual nationality. I do not think
it will have any effect at all, because the nationalities which he has will depend,
of course, on the laws of the various countries, including the country of origin.
For instance, some States have a law that any of their subjects who becomes
naturalised automatically loses the nationality of his State of origin-whether he
takes a dramatic or a dull Oath.
64 Id.
65 See pp. 629-80 supra.
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First, he might at the time of his naturalization take a "dull" oath and
file a declaration of intent to retain his American citizenship. In such
a case he would retain that citizenship. This might well be considered
undesirable by the country in which he was naturalized, in which case
that country might provide that his naturalization was void. An alterna-
tive solution would be for countries that do not want their naturalized
citizens to retain their former nationality to require such persons to
expressly renounce their former citizenship before becoming natural-
ized. 6
Second, a person might take a "dramatic" oath and not file a
declaration of intent to retain his American citizenship. In such a
case he would lose his citizenship, absent duress or a lack of knowledge
of his United States citizenship.
Should a person perform inconsistent acts, such as taking a "dra-
matic" oath and giving notice of intent to retain United States citizen-
ship, neither of the acts could be conclusive proof of his intent. Since
the purpose of a "dramatic" oath is to prevent a person's acquiring a
country's citizenship without renouncing his former nationality, his
naturalization under such circumstances would probably be void; ex-
patriation would render him stateless. For that reason, or because
there was no valid naturalization, such a person should not be held
to have lost his citizenship.
Only in the case of a person who has taken a "dull" oath and
filed no declaration of intent could there exist substantial doubt as
to citizenship status. A presumption in such a case that citizenship
has been lost would be realistic: in view of the drawbacks of dual
nationality, naturalization usually implies renunciation of any former
allegiance. Such a presumption would preclude our government's de-
manding the allegiance of those who have been naturalized elsewhere
without stating their intent to retain American citizenship. Such
demands by other countries at times have been the source of some
international friction. 7
Conceivably, of course, one might intend to retain his American
citizenship yet take no steps to insure that he does so-the Savorgnan
situation. Intent would then have to be determined as a question of
fact, as was petitioner's intent in Savorgnan. The presumption of loss
66 For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1964) provides a means of formal renunciation
of American citizenship while abroad.
67 For example, Germany in World War I and Italy under Mussolini claimed the
allegiance of German- and Italian-born Americans. See Wigmore, Domicile, Double
Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21 ILL, L, REv, 761, 766-67 (1927).
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of nationality, the availability of a means of showing intent to retain
nationality, and the good judgment of the courts would seem sufficient
to bar a claim of retention of American citizenship by a person who
had become naturalized abroad, intending to renounce his citizenship,
and later regretted his decision. 8
The above proposals contrast sharply with what has long been the
American legislative policy with regard to nationality. Far from being
a radical departure, however, they represent a return to the concept
of citizenship held by many at the time the fourteenth amendment
was adopted.6 9 What caused those concepts to be abandoned? The idea
that expatriation was justified to prevent embarrassment in foreign
affairs seems to have been little more than an excuse to permit Congress
to meddle with citizenship under the foreign affairs power, a power
which was held in Afroyim not to extend to citizenship. The idea
that acts which are "inconsistent with undiluted allegiance" 70 should
be grounds for expatriation has often been used to uphold the loss-of-
nationality statutes, though even before Afroyim dicta in a number
of cases had undermined this theory.71 A reading of the statutes and
their legislative histories suggests that most of the expatriation sections
of the Immigration and Nationality Acts do nothing more than
penalize, and penalize harshly, acts which do not conform to Congress'
ideas of "good citizenship. '"72
Although little has been said above of the other expatriation
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Acts, the arguments
68 Such cases may soon arise, since many Americans have recently fled this country
to avoid military service. Some of them will undoubtedly become naturalized elsewhere
and may later wish to return to the United States.
69 As recently as 1903 expatriation was defined as "the voluntary abandonment of,
and the renunciation of allegiance to, one's native or adopted country, and becoming the
citizen or subject of another country." Slaymaker, The Right of the American Citizen to
Expatriate, 37 Am. L. Rl~v. 191 (1903) (footnote omitted). Except for a Civil War statute
concerning deserters, Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 490, a statute which provided for loss
of the rights of citizenship and not for loss of citizenship itself, there was no statutory
provision for involuntary expatriation until 1907. See Roche, The Loss of American
Nationality-The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 61-62
(1950); Note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE LJ. 1164, 1171-72 (1955). See gen-
"erally I-MsxN TSIANG, THE QUESrION OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERIcA PRIOR TO 1907 (1942).
70 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 214 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964) (living abroad for long periods is
not indicative of lack of allegiance); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958): "[C]itizenship
is not lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked." For an analysis of the impact of
these and other cases on the Perez holding see Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term,
Forword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Government," 78 HAv. L. REv. 143, 169-75 (1964).
72 Cf. Brief For Petitioner at 24, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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against expatriation because of acquisition of foreign citizenship apply
a fortiori to such acts as "serving in . . . the armed forces of a foreign
state" 73 or accepting government employment in foreign countries
under certain circumstances. 4 Such acts should no longer result in
expatriation. If their commission harms the United States, the solu-
tion to the problem is the imposition of criminal penalties,1 5 not
deprivation of citizenship.
Alan M. Gunn
73 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 3S7(a)(3), 66 Stat. 258, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(3) (1964). The Government seems not to have interpreted Afroyim as applicable
to this section. See 1967 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 28.
74 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4) (1964).
75 Although laws imposing such criminal penalties could not be enforced until the
individual concerned returned to the United States, the situation would be no worse than
the present expatriation provisions, since loss of citizenship becomes most important to the
expatriate when he desires to return to this country.
